Waziristan-The Battle Begins
By Anwaar Hussain of TruthSpring
Finally, the battle on the one-time protégés begins-the battle that was first promised in June and for which troops had been gathering on Waziristan’s horizons for the past four months. The critical delay not only enabled the militants to overcome the reverses they had suffered in the Malakand region earlier during the summer but to also hit back at the government with added venom. Though the beginning of the battle is indeed hastened by the bewildering tempo at which the godmen have struck at targets across the country during the last couple of weeks, it has begun.
This battle is a strange mix. That is a given. While it is unconventional in the sense that it is not a standard face-off between regular armies, yet is conventional in that it is the same old war with each side trying to impose its will upon the other. Conventional or not, there is no running away from this one. Now is the time to fight.
While everyone is hurrying to the battle stations, here are a few fundamental dos and don’ts that need to be stuck to like glue in the weeks and months ahead.
Hijack the godmen’s cause. History is replete with examples of insurgencies that have degenerated to out-and-out criminalities. This one is no different. The government should use all means at its disposal i.e. media, clerics, political leaders, etc., to highlight the fact that these are no godmen. These are common thugs involved in drug trade, kidnappings for ransom, and contract killings, to name a few activities, masquerading as godmen. Take their golden shoe away from them and beat them back with it. Not only will this infuriate the godmen into a blinding rage and the accompanied stumbles, discrediting the insurgents is also a much easier way to cut an insurgency off and let it die rather than having to kill every insurgent. Victory will be gained only when this isolation of the godmen is achieved and maintained permanently by and with the active support of the populace.
Tell the Americans to stay away at this time. While thinking Pakistanis do understand that the bombing of barber shops, blowing up of girls’ schools and lashing women has nothing to do with Pakistan being ‘the most allied of America’s allies’ and everything to do with the dark dogma of the godmen, for now the Americans need to watch silently from the sidelines. They have lost much face with their blundering jaunts in Iraq and Afghanistan and the wanton killings in those unfortunate countries. They need to stand back and refrain from adding further weight to the Taliban’s golden shoe. This does not mean of course that America stops propping up covertly Pakistan’s armed muscle, a muscle made much addicted to the steroids of American support in arms and funds. The Americans know of course that they have had a giant’s hand in the genesis of the problem and cannot simply wish themselves away now.
Maintain the momentum. Once gained, Pakistan Army must guard against losing the momentum. They allowed this in the past and the results eventually proved to be disastrous. The tempo and timing of operations is going to be vital to the success of this conflict. Insurgents have been allowed enough time to have planned properly and, whatever the official spin, may appear to control the situation when the war begins. But given their limited resources, the control of the pace of events and scope of activities will soon shift to Pakistan Army. Patience is the name of the game.
Don’t talk of winding it up in days/weeks. Be prepared for the long haul. By its very nature, insurgencies are protracted affairs. Even after several months, Malakand continues to remain on a low boil. Moreover, given South Waziristan’s terrain and the nature of the foe, a significant part of the militants’ strategy would be to encourage the military to penetrate deeper into the region i.e. farther up into the mountains, the favorite fighting ground of the militants, and then tie the soldiers down with hit-and-run tactics. That is likely to keep the soldiers engaged in a long-drawn-out operation in the unfriendly terrain over the winter. It is not prudent to give false hopes of a quick end to a populace whose support to the operation is as critical as the negative shift in their fickle opinion disastrous.
Be believable. It must be understood that numerous audiences are watching this war. The military must not allow truth to become the first casualty as usual. Either credible information must be given out or none at all when situation so demands. Killing 2000 insurgents in a village of 200 families is a hyperbole of the overkill kind. The military must make sure that their deeds match their words. Any perceived contradiction would destroy its credibility and undermine the counterinsurgency efforts. A little time into the conflict, one side is going to gain and the other lose credibility, much to the sorrow of the loser.
Learn and adjust. Militants’ tactics would evolve constantly. In response the military would have to observe, draw lessons, use them, assess results and quickly adjust. This learning cycle, requiring an efficient adaptation on the military’s part, must repeat continuously and faster than that of the enemy. Here, one can draw some solace from the fact the recent Malakand operation has kind of weathered our troops for this type of conflict.
But above all what needs to be remembered is that while there is no doubt that the Pakistan Army will eventually come out tops in this conflict, insurgencies are not defeated by simply killing all the insurgents. The root causes of this discontent, through reforms, education and reconstruction projects, will soon have to be addressed. General Chang Ting-chen of Mao Zedong’s Central Committee once stated that revolutionary war was 80 percent political action and only 20 percent military. The same applies to counterinsurgencies too. One is desperately hoping, therefore, that along with this much needed military operation, the other 80% action too is being contemplated.
Notice how the scribe has written one whole piece without using the word ‘religion’? And that is because, as Dave Barry once said, “The problem with writing about religion is that you run the risk of offending sincerely religious people, and then they come after you with machetes.”
A machete is a large heavy knife with a broad blade used as an implement for cutting ‘things’.
